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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at 
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, 
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. 
This CIWAG case study on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) is one 
in a new series examining the role of economics in national/international 
security and irregular warfare. In the globalized irregular warfare (IW) 
world of the twenty-first century, understanding the operating 
environment is paramount. In particular, it is vital to think about who 
wields power and influence in that environment, not only inside a state but 
also across state borders. Outside actors, such as private companies and 
sovereign wealth funds, can bring tremendous pressure and influence on 
the decisions of a government. This may in turn support and enhance, or 
frustrate and undermine, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, or 
counterinsurgency efforts. The key to understanding, anticipating, and 
shaping these influences is a solid understanding of the strategic logic 
behind those interests, including what a sovereign wealth fund does and 
how they operate. 
Sovereign wealth funds, as Mr. Krishnadas explains, are state-
owned investment funds. They can help states “achieve economic growth, 
finance public policy, and underpin sovereign security.” This case study 
focuses on the Singaporean experience with SWFs and discusses its 
unique history, the strategic logic behind creating a SWF, how it can be 
used, and what a state can do with the income from SWFs. Mr. 
Krishnadas, an international expert on the topic, sets out some of the 
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terminology behind SWFs in order to open up this concept for non-
specialist readers and show the tremendous benefits that a well-managed 
SWF can provide to their own state.  
This holistic analysis of a single SWF example raises many 
broader issues that IW practitioners need to be aware of: across the 
globe—from the port of New Jersey to the copper mines in trans-Sahel 
Africa—governments are wrestling with the issue of foreign financial 
influence and national security. This becomes even more acute in states 
that are trying to transition from conflict to stability: When should states 
allow or encourage other countries to invest in them, and what industries 
should they allow foreign companies to own or build? Should states allow 
foreign investment funds to build infrastructure, extract rare minerals, and 
operate ports? How does this support or undermine the legitimacy and 
authority of that state? Successful IW practitioners need to understand and 
be able to account for third-party influence in its many varieties in order to 
be successful. The case study provides expert insight on a little-known but 
increasingly prevalent source of influence that is of growing consequence 
to IW efforts. 
This case study is a place to begin the conversation about the 
linkage between economics and security, particularly in regions in the 
world where armed groups and irregular warfare are a daily reality. 
Singapore is not alone in its utilization of SWFs to bolster its domestic 
security and stability, and there is much more work to be done in 
exploring this issue. As a starting point, for example, the appendices show 
the distribution of the largest funds, including some of the newest—a $5 
billion fund set up by Angola, and a $1 billion fund set up by Nigeria.  In 
addition, the bibliography gives a snapshot of China’s SWF strategy in the 
U.S. and in conflict zones around the world. As we grapple with the role 
of economics and financial influence on conflicts, this case study provides 
a first look at the power that state-owned investment funds can wield at 
home and abroad. 
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First, 
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the opinions found herein are solely those of the author and do not 
represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War College, 
or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct any 
factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the 
content of this case study.   
We hope you find it useful, and look forward to hearing your 
feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War 
College. 
 
  
KRISHNADAS 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS TOOLS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
6 
 
Author Biography 
 
Devadas Krishnadas, the founder and managing director of Future-
Moves, has extensive experience in both the public and the private sectors. 
He has an established reputation as a thought leader, and writes and speaks 
regularly across Asia on policy and political risk. As a Fulbright scholar, 
Mr. Krishnadas studied at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and he 
also was an International Merit Scholar at the University of Sydney. He 
has completed executive training at the business schools of both the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
  
KRISHNADAS 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS TOOLS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
7 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Message from the Editors ...................................................................................... 3 
Author Biography ................................................................................................... 6 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 9 
II. Sovereign Wealth Funds .................................................................................. 11 
III. The Singapore Security Challenge ................................................................... 13 
IV. An Economic Transformation ......................................................................... 16 
V. Singapore Sovereign Wealth Funds ................................................................. 17 
VI. The Security of Singapore ............................................................................... 19 
VII. National Strategy ........................................................................................... 22 
Annex A: Figures and Tables ................................................................................ 26 
Figure 1: Top 10 Sovereign Wealth Funds (in US$ Billion) ........................... 27 
Figure 2: Distribution of Sovereign Wealth Fund Assets ............................. 28 
Figure 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Funding Source and Region .............. 29 
Figure 4: Stewards of Singapore’s Reserves ................................................ 31 
Figure 5: Expenditure by the Government of Singapore for FY2013 (by 
Sector) .......................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 6: Military Expenditure Per Capita by Country, 2012, in US$ ........... 33 
Figure 7: Effective Income Tax and Social Security Rates on US$100,000 of 
Gross Income ............................................................................................... 34 
Figure 8: Corporate Tax Rates of Selected Countries 2013 ......................... 35 
Figure 9: Indirect Tax Rates of Selected Countries, 2013 ............................ 36 
Figure 10: Percentage of Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC) Over 
Total Expenditure (Excludes Special Transfers) ........................................... 37 
KRISHNADAS 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS TOOLS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
8 
 
Table 1: The 5 Largest Importers of Major Conventional Weapons and Their 
Major Suppliers, 2008-2012 ......................................................................... 38 
Table 2: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($ million)
...................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 3: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($ million) 
(Items Rearranged) ...................................................................................... 42 
Annex B: Bibliography .......................................................................................... 43 
 
 
  
KRISHNADAS 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS TOOLS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
9 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Singapore is a tiny,1 affluent Southeast Asian city-state situated at 
the southern tip of the Peninsula Malaysia. It is the world’s fourth-leading 
global financial center2 and operates the world’s best airport,3 one of the 
world’s top oil refineries,4 and one of busiest ports in the world—all while 
providing a high standard of living for its people.5 Its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita income is the third highest in the world, ahead 
of its former colonial master, the United Kingdom, as well as the United 
States.6 
A lesser known fact is that Singapore has been able to secure its 
sovereignty with one of the world’s most technologically modern 
militaries. With a population of just over 5 million,7 it is the fifth-largest 
arms importer in the world, accounting for 4 percent of the world’s total 
spending on arms imports,8 and its defense spending per head is in excess 
of every country except the United States and Saudi Arabia.  
What enables a small country to operate one of the most advanced 
weaponry systems in the world, including the F-15SG Eagle, the F-16D 
Block 52+ Fighting Falcon, and Formidable-class stealth frigates, and still 
run budget surplus while practicing one of the lowest tax systems in the 
world?  
This paper will show that Singapore’s sovereignty has been 
underpinned by the performance of its sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). It 
                                                          
1 270 square miles, or less than a quarter of the size of Rhode Island. 
2 “The Global Financial Centres Index 13,” Long Finance, March 2013. 
3“The World’s Top 100 Airports,” World Airport Awards 2013, Skytrax, 
http://www.worldairportawards.com/Awards_2013/top100.htm 
4 Oil & Gas Journal 
5 “2012 Quality of Living Worldwide City Rankings,” Mercer, 4 December 2012. 
6 Gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita, World 
Economic Database, April 2013, International Monetary Fund. 
7 Population and Land Area, Singapore Department of Statistics, 2012. 
8“Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet, March 2013. 
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is the successful performance of these funds that have provided the 
financial means for Singapore to defend itself without compromising its 
domestic programs, to buttress its open economy from economic shocks, 
and to augment its land-limited economic space with global investments. 
As such, its sovereign wealth funds play the role of national strategy tools 
that help to ensure national security and prosperity. 
SWFs are state-owned investment funds. Since 2005, at least 30 
SWFs have been created, and the assets managed by SWFs have grown, 
buoyed in part by the rise in commodities prices, from over $3,000 billion 
in 2007 to over $5,000 billion in 2013.9 Sovereign wealth funds can be 
strategic instruments to achieve economic growth, finance public policy, 
and underpin sovereign security. The paper will use Singapore as a case 
study, as it has operated SWFs for over 40 years and has successfully 
integrated their function into fiscal policy to drive a remarkable economic 
transformation.  
  
                                                          
9“Recent Sovereign Wealth Fund Market Size by Quarter,” Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute, June 2013.  
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II. Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute defines a SWF as the 
following:  
 
a state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly 
established from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign 
currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, governmental 
transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from 
resource exports. The definition of sovereign wealth fund 
exclude, among other things, foreign currency reserve assets held 
by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or 
monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
traditional sense, government-employee pension funds (funded 
by employee/employer contributions), or assets managed for the 
benefit of individuals.10 
 
The concept of creating a savings fund or a stabilization fund on a 
sovereign level only started to gain traction after World War II. In 1953, 
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait, decided to use 
its oil revenue to create a fund called the Kuwait Investment Board11 for 
the future and reduce its reliance on a single nonrenewable source.  
                                                          
10“What Is a SWF?,” SWF Institute, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund.  
Interestingly, the first SWF has its origin back in the 19th-century United States. The 
state of Texas created the Texas Special School Fund (now known as the Permanent 
School Fund) in 1854 to assist in the funding of public education and easing the tax 
burden of the state’s citizens. The initial funding of $2 million was part of a $10 million 
payment from the U.S. government in exchange for relinquishing land claims on parts of 
western lands (parts of the current states of New Mexico, Colorado, and Oklahoma) by 
the former Republic of Texas. “The Handbook of Texas – Permanent School Fund,” 
Texas State Historical Association, Retrieved from website on 17 July 2013, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/khp01 
11 Currently known as the Kuwait Investment Authority. 
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Over the next couple of decades, more SWFs were established. To 
date, 69 known funds have been established, spanning varied sovereign 
origins and asset sizes. China (excluding Hong Kong) reigns at the top, 
with US$1.2 trillion in assets with its four SWFs, followed by Abu Dhabi 
and Norway at a distant second and third, respectively, with about US$0.7 
trillion worth of assets each.  
A powerful motivation to the formation of SWFs is the “Dutch 
disease,”12 in which a resource boom eventually has a negative impact on 
a country’s economy due an overreliance on resources, to the neglect of 
the non-commodity export sector. Close to 70 percent of SWFs have 
commodity-based origins and more look to be on the way. Speaking about 
the recent approval by Israel’s cabinet to create a sovereign wealth fund 
with revenue from natural gas discoveries, head of Israel’s National 
Economic Council Eugene Kandel said, “The reason we are doing it now 
is because we want to manage the expectations of various currency 
markets, to show that we understand what ‘Dutch Disease’ is and [that] we 
are going to take care of its consequences.”13 
It should be highlighted that the economic effect of an influx of 
foreign currency is not strictly confined to the space of natural resources 
but rather includes “any development that results in a large inflow of 
foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, 
foreign assistance, and foreign direct investment.”14 Non-commodity-
based countries that created SWFs for the purpose of savings for future 
generations have well understood the importance of deferring immediate 
gratification. Foremost amongst these countries is Singapore.  
                                                          
12Coined by The Economist in 1977, when reporting on the discovery of a large natural 
gas deposits in the North Sea back in 1959 and the subsequent decline of Netherlands’s 
manufacturing sector. 
13“Israel Gas-Fund Law Shows ‘Dutch Disease’ Awareness, Kandel Says,” Alisa 
Odenheimer and Calev Ben-David, Bloomberg News, 15 April 2013. 
14Christine Ebrahim-zadeh, “Back to Basics – Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth 
Managed Unwisely,” Finance and Development, Vol. 40, No 1, March 2003. 
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III. The Singapore Security Challenge 
 
Singapore is a tiny island nation situated at a geographically 
strategic point where the Johor Straits leads into the pathways to the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is a secular country with a small but 
cosmopolitan population. It is prosperous and meritocratic. It has rule of 
law and civic order. Singapore is a close friend to Israel. It is a strategic 
ally to both the United States, and increasingly to China. It has no natural 
resources, yet is the most affluent country in Southeast Asia. 
All of these things make it an exception in its neighborhood. It is 
surrounded by much larger countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. All of its 
fellow countries have large populations and are resource-rich. Malaysia, 
its closest neighbor,15 practices a racially biased national policy that grants 
preferential treatment to Malays. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are 
predominantly Muslim. Both countries have antagonistic relationships 
with Israel and historically rocky relationships with the United States. And 
Singapore itself has a convoluted history with both its major neighbors 
that has conditioned its approach to national security. To fully understand 
this approach requires a brief familiarization with that colorful history. 
The history of modern Singapore can be traced back to the early 
19th century. Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the lieutenant governor of 
Bencoolen (now Bengkulu) in Sumatra, set out to look for a trading station 
at the tip of the Malay Peninsula to protect the British merchant fleet along 
the lucrative spice route and to forestall any potential advances by the 
Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago, then called the East Indies. Attracted 
by the island’s natural deep harbor and strategic location, Raffles signed a 
treaty with the Sultan of Johor in 1819 to establish Singapore as a trading 
post of the East India Company. It subsequently became one of British 
Straits Settlements in 1826. 
                                                          
15 Singapore and Malaysia are connected by a 0.6 mile bridge. At its narrowest, the straits 
of Johor is only half a mile wide.  
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The early years of peace and prosperity gave no hints to the 
tumultuous years that would follow the British surrender of the settlement 
to the Japanese in 1942. It was a rude awakening that Singapore, the 
“Impregnable Fortress,” could fall to the Japanese in just seven days—a 
debacle that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described as “the 
worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.”  
The end of the war did not long see the end of troubles. The 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had allied with the British to 
fight the Japanese, now turned its attention to insurrection. It initiated a 
terrorist campaign along the length of the Malayan peninsula. Singapore 
was subject to bombings, assassinations, and riots. This period, which the 
British referred to as the “Emergency,” was only brought under control 
after a decade of brutal counterinsurgent warfare.16 
Just as the tempo of the Emergency began to slow, Singapore faced 
another existential threat—this time from Sukarno’s Indonesia. In 1959, 
Singapore was granted limited self-government, and it formed a federation 
with Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo in 1963, together becoming 
Malaysia. President Sukarno, the volatile Indonesian leader, was opposed 
to the formation of a federated Malaysia, however, and in 1962, he 
launched a violent campaign called Konfrontasi, or “Confrontation,” to 
disrupt and destabilize the nascent state. 
During the Emergency, Singapore—still a colony without any 
indigenous armed forces—was entirely reliant on the British for its 
security needs. Even as part of the Federation, Singapore remained almost 
totally dependent on the British to fight the Indonesian challenge. The 
Konfrontasi was successfully brought to a close in 1966, but not before 
some 37 bombs had been set off in Singapore and a pair of Indonesian 
marines were caught, convicted, and subsequently hung for sabotage 
                                                          
16 The MCP would not surrender until 1989 in the wake of the fall of communism. Its 
former leader, Chin Peng, resides today in a “peace village” in Southern Thailand. 
Despite his repeated requests to return to Singapore to spend his last years, he continues 
to be denied entry. 
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activities by the government of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s tough-minded 
prime minister.17 
Ideological conflicts between the leaders of Singapore and Malaya 
resulted in Singapore having to leave Malaysia in August 1965. These two 
and a half decades of violence, civic unrest, and political volatility has had 
a determinative effect on the thinking of Singapore leaders, both past and 
present. Acutely conscious of the island’s vulnerability, Singapore’s 
leadership committed to a strong national defense policy to protect the 
sovereignty of the young nation. To finance such a defense, the country 
had to do well economically and do so quickly.  
In 1971, the financially weakened British withdrew its security 
umbrella from Singapore. Henceforth, the island nation would have to go 
it alone. It was economically crippled, financially weak, militarily 
inadequate, surrounded by recent enemies, and geographically significant 
in the middle of a Cold War. It would successfully overcome these 
limitations and challenges and it would do so in part with the aid of a 
“secret weapon”—its sovereign wealth funds. 
 
  
                                                          
17 The two marines were convicted on 20 October 1965, and hanged on 17 Oct 1968 after 
their appeals were dismissed. Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board, 
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/ae11ffee-53fe-4486-95fd-ebc2a85abcc1.html and 
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_62_2004-12-17.html  
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IV. An Economic Transformation 
 
At the time of the withdrawal of their security umbrella, British 
armed forces contributed over 20 percent to Singapore’s gross national 
product, and the military bases provided employment to 1 in 10 people.18 
Their departure thus left not just a security deficit but an economic one.  
In building the young nation, the Singapore leaders with Lee Kuan 
Yew at the helm began aggressive industrialization to develop the 
country’s manufacturing and export sectors. These measures were helped 
along by the rapid expansion of the world economy, which gave Singapore 
an economic boom through the 1960s and 1970s.  
It transitioned from a predominantly labor-intensive manufacturing 
economy in the 1960s and 1970s to including capital-intensive and high-
value-adding industries in the 1980s, and subsequently to a skill- and 
knowledge-based economy in the 1990s. In the process, Singapore’s GDP 
grew from a modest US$704.5 million in 1960 to US$276.5 billion in 
2012.  
The process of industrialization and the aggressive bid to develop 
the economy saw the Singapore government taking on stakes in various 
local companies, start-ups, and joint ventures. These included a bank, 
hotels, an iron and steel mill, an airline, and even the zoo and a bird park. 
In order to allow the government to focus on its core role of policy making 
and regulations, a move was made to establish a separate investment firm 
to manage such assets commercially. Singapore’s economic success in its 
early days also saw a rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, and the 
government decided that its reserves would be better invested in longer-
term and high-yielding assets. In 1981, this led to the formation of the 
Government Investment Corporation. 
 
                                                          
18 “British Withdrawal from Singapore,” Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board 
Singapore 2009,  http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1001_2009-02-10.html 
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V. Singapore Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
The first SWF established by Singapore was Temasek Holdings, 
which was set up in 1974 with an initial asset base of about US$150 
million.19 It was initially comprised of various equity stakes formerly held 
by the nation’s Ministry of Finance. Temasek takes mainly active equity 
and often concentrates interest in identified firms of certain strategic 
industries, mainly in Asia (including Singapore).  
Six years later, the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC) was launched. This SWF was tasked to manage 
Singapore’s foreign reserves, with the aim of preserving and enhancing its 
purchasing power. Its mandate is to achieve a good, sustainable real rate of 
return over a 20-year time horizon. GIC adopts a highly diversified 
approach towards its investment, with footprints in more than 45 
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets globally dealing with 
stocks, futures and options, fixed income, natural resources, foreign 
exchange, cash, and derivatives. While most of its investments are in the 
public markets, it also has a smaller component in alternative investments 
such as private equity and real estate.20 
While Temasek and GIC are widely recognized as the two 
“official” sovereign wealth funds of Singapore, the country’s central bank, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), has a similar function. One 
of its functions is to manage the country’s official foreign reserves.21 
                                                          
19 Temasek Holdings had an initial portfolio valued at S$354 million, or about US$150 
million after conversion. 
20 “Our Business – Overview,” GIC, http://www.gic.com.sg/en/our-business/overview; 
and “Investment Report by the Group Chief Investment Officer,” Report on the 
Management of the Government’s Portfolio for the Year 2011/12, GIC Pte Ltd. 
21 MAS’s functions are (1) to act as the central bank of Singapore, including the conduct 
of monetary policy, the issuance of currency, the oversight of payment systems, and 
serving as banker to and financial agent of the Government; (2) to conduct integrated 
supervision of financial services and financial stability surveillance; (3) to manage the 
official foreign reserves of Singapore; and (4) to develop Singapore as an international 
financial center. Source: “Overview of MAS,” http://www.mas.gov.sg/ 
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While MAS is not technically a SWF, it does have some elements of one; 
for instance, it appoints external fund managers to manage funds across a 
range of investment mandates. As a central bank, MAS adopts a 
conservative approach in its investment, with a significant proportion of 
its portfolio invested in liquid financial market instruments.22  
These three entities together form a portfolio model for the 
investment of sovereign reserves. Temasek, with its active approach to 
equities, takes the highest risk; GIC, with its focus on a highly diversified 
approach, assumes the middle risk profile; and MAS, preferring to stay 
mostly liquid, is the most conservative investor.  
 
  
                                                          
22 “Our Nation’s Reserves,” Government of Singapore, Ministry of Finance, 
http://app.mof.gov.sg/index.aspx 
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VI. The Security of Singapore  
 
The security of Singapore is not merely a military consideration; it 
is also a financial and economic one. As a young nation without a deep 
history, and one that is contained on a small island, its viability as a 
sovereign country is conditional on its economic success. This is what 
permits it to “punch above its weight” in the international political, 
financial, and economic arenas.  
Surrounded by neighbors many times its size that were strikingly 
different in terms of population makeup, religions, and languages, laden 
with unpleasant memories from the days of confrontation with Indonesia 
and its rancorous split with Malaysia, Singapore was determined to arm 
itself to secure its sovereignty. 
The island’s geographical limitation and limited population size 
led to the Singapore Armed Forces’ decision to build needed capabilities 
to fight swiftly and decisively in war. The stated mission of  the Ministry 
of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces is “to enhance Singapore’s 
peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these 
fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.”23 State-of-
the-art military equipment as well as systems and networks are constantly 
being added to its arsenal through international arms purchases or are 
developed on-shore by the government-affiliated defense contractor. 
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
between 2008-2012, Singapore was the fifth-largest arms importer in the 
world and accounts for 4 percent of the world’s total spending on arms 
imports.24  
The nation’s defense spending has seen a steady increase over the 
years, reaching US$10 billion in budgeted expenditure for FY2013. It is 
                                                          
23 “Mission,” MINDEF, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html 
24 “The Main Importers and Exporters of Major Arms, 2008-2012,” in “International 
Arms Transfers,” chap. 5, SIPRI Yearbook 2013, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/05 
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by far the largest single line item in the nation’s budget and accounts for 
3.3 percent of GDP.25 In terms of military spending per capita, Singpore is 
dwarfed only by the United States and Saudi Arabia.  
Singapore today possesses the most technologically advanced 
military in Southeast Asia.26 Weaponry includes platforms such as the 
McDonnell Douglas F-15SG jet fighter, the F-16 Block 52+ Fighting 
Falcon, modernized Leopard A4 main battle tanks, Swedish-built diesel 
submarines, French-built frigates equipped with modern weapon systems 
such as the AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, the 
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon, and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship 
missile. 
As well as ensuring it has the most up-to-date arms, Singapore 
practices conscription. It requires every male citizen to spend two years in 
compulsory military service, commencing at the age of 18. Upon 
completion of this period of national service, men continue to serve in the 
reserves for at least 10 years. Collectively, the active and reserve force 
constitute some 200,000 men. These forces are well-equipped and 
exercised regularly. 
These forces are not only modern, they are also expensively 
trained and deployed. Singapore has training arrangements with Australia, 
India, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, and France. It regularly participates in 
rigorous and complicated training exercises such as Red Flag in the United 
States and Maple Flag in Canada, while itself hosting multilateral training 
events by the participants in the Five Power Defence Arrangement.27  
                                                          
25“Budget Highlights – Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Budget 2013, Singapore 
Government, 25 February 2013, p. 19. 
26Jesse Vreeken, “Singapore’s Burgeoning Armed Forces, a Steadying Force,” 
International Political Review, 2 February 2012, 
http://www.theinternationalpoliticalreview.com/singapores-burgeoning-armed-forces-a-
steadying-force/ 
27 The Five Power Defence Arrangement is a mutual security pact between Singapore, 
Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. 
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Due to the limitations of its airspace, Singapore maintains overseas 
training and operational conversion units for several of its frontline types. 
These include a flying training school located at RAAF Base Pearce in 
western Australia; a AS532 Cougar helicopter support squadron at Oakey 
Army Aviation Centre in Queensland, Australia; a lead-in fighter training 
squadron based in Cazaux, France; a F-16 operational conversion unit at 
Luke Air Force Base in Arizona;28 an AH-64D Apache helicopter 
operational conversion unit at Silverbell Army Heliport, also in Arizona;29 
a F-15SG Eagle operational conversion unit at Mountain Home Air Force 
Base in Idaho;30 and a CH-47D Chinook helicopter operational conversion 
unit at Grand Prairie, Texas.31 These forces in effect also represent a 
dispersal of air forces, theoretically permitting a second-strike capability 
for home defense.  
Singapore also constructed a purpose-built naval base that can 
berth the largest aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy. It is now a de facto 
operating base for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In 2012, the U.S. Navy 
deployed its latest littoral combat ship, the USS Freedom (LCS-1), to 
Singapore as part of a long-term commitment to forward deploy this 
capability. These security arrangements with the United States are both 
manifestations and anchors of the strategic partnership that Singapore 
enjoys with the world’s reigning superpower. Such a relationship 
augments its own capabilities to provide a continuing unassailable self-
defense position.  
Despite heavy spending on defense, Singapore still enjoys a 
healthy fiscal position, and the government’s coffers continue to grow. As 
Table 2 in Annex A shows, the nation’s book has been mainly positive 
over the years, save for a dip experienced in FY2009 in the aftermath of 
the worldwide financial crisis. 
                                                          
28 Flying badged as 425th Fighter Squadron in the U.S. Air Force. 
29 Flying badged as 1-285th Army Aviation Unit in the U.S. Army. 
30 Flying badged as the 428th Fighter Squadron in the U.S. Air Force. 
31 Flying badged as the 149th Aviation Unit in the U.S. Army. 
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VII. National Strategy 
 
Singapore has managed to keep its defense spending at such high 
levels without compromising its fiscal soundness or resorting to punishing 
taxation. Indeed, quite the reverse: In 2012, Singapore was ranked the best 
country for doing business for the seventh year in a row.32 One of the 
strategies adopted by the government is to maintain a competitive tax 
environment for both companies and individuals. According to KPMG’s 
Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate Survey 2012,33 Singapore 
has one of the lowest personal income taxes in the world: the effective 
income tax rate for someone earning $100,000 annually is less than 7 
percent (Figure 7). Similarly, the corporate tax rate it levies is also among 
the most competitive, at 17 percent (Figure 8). Its Goods and Services Tax 
or Value-Added Tax, another important component of the tax system, is 
also among the lowest at 7 percent (Figure 9). 
That leaves the question: What is the balancing factor in the 
equation? The answer: sovereign wealth funds. Examining the national 
accounts, one might be intrigued by a special revenue line item labeled 
“Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) 
Contribution.” This line item refers to financial returns generated by the 
SWFs.  
Under Article 142(1A)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore, the government is able to use up to 50 percent of the net 
investment return—the sum of: (1) the long-term expected real rate of 
return on the reserves invested by GIC and MAS, and (2) the net 
                                                          
32 “Doing Business 2013 – Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises,” 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, 23 Oct 2012, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2013 
33 KPGM International, “KPMG’s Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate 
Survey 2012,” October 2012, www.kpmg.com.  
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investment income on the remaining assets, comprising primarily 
Temasek—to supplement its spending in the annual budget.34 
The contribution of this item is nontrivial. Between FY2007 and 
2012, it helped cover 7–17 percent of combined operating and 
development expenditure (Figure 10). In fact, without the contributions by 
the three stewards, the nation’s budget would have slipped into the red 
zone starting in FY2008 (Table 3). Further, without NIR contributions, the 
government would find it difficult to finance its social programs to share 
the benefits of economic growth with residents, especially for those in the 
lower income brackets. 
Fully 75 percent of Singapore’s GDP is derived from exports, 
leaving the country acutely sensitive to global macroeconomic events. The 
global financial crisis of 2008–2009 threatened to undermine the health of 
the entire world’s economy. Singapore, as both a financial center and a 
small, open-export-oriented economy, quickly registered negative effects. 
However, during the peak of the crisis in late 2008 when the lending 
market froze and Lehman Brothers failed, the Singapore government 
announced that it would guarantee all Singapore dollar and foreign 
currency deposits of individual and non-bank customers in licensed banks, 
finance companies, and merchant banks. This was backed by US$120 
billion in reserves.35 Signs of economic slowdown were still apparent, 
with the economy contracting 10 percent in the first quarter of FY2009 
alone. In light of the severe strain on the economy, the government also 
introduced a US$12 billion “resilience package” as a countermeasure. Key 
points included a jobs credit program to assist businesses with wages and a 
special risk-sharing initiative aimed at stimulating bank lending. The 
availability of the reserves allowed the government to take prompt and 
decisive action in a time of extreme crisis. This was not the first time that 
reserves had come in handy. One reason that Singapore was able to 
                                                          
34 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, http://app.agc.gov.sg/. 
35 Joint Press Statement by Singapore’s Ministry of Finance and Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, 16 October 2008. 
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weather the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 better than its neighbors 
was the existence of its significant reserves. This deterred the kind of 
speculative attacks on its currency that bedeviled its neighbors in ASEAN, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Thailand and 
Malaysia.36 
Singapore’s financial and economic strength is enhanced by the 
agency of its sovereign wealth funds. The investments made through them 
permit Singapore to extend its economic footprint beyond its limited land 
space. In doing so, it not only increases its financial and economic 
performance but also uses the SWF investments as a hedge against 
asynchronous performance at regional or sectoral levels. This helps to 
dampen the sensitivity of such an open economy to macroeconomic events 
such as the Asian and global financial crises. 
Singapore’s political, economic, and financial performance has 
also underwritten its participation in leading international forums. 
Singapore was one of the key participants that helped developed the 
Santiago Principles, a set of voluntary principles and practices governing 
SWFs. In 2011, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam was appointed the first Asian chair of 
the International Monetary and Financial Committee. Singapore has 
enjoyed observer status in the G-20 for several years. It continues to play a 
leading role in ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. It 
has also had the distinction of serving a term as president of the Security 
Council of the United Nations. In 2012, Singapore, unusually for an 
equatorial country, was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic 
Council.  
While physically a small nation, Singapore is treated as a 
heavyweight by the international community. This reflects the nation’s 
                                                          
36 Maria Delfina Alcaide Garrido, “Government and External Risk Mitigation: Why Was 
Singapore Less Affected by the Asian Financial Crisis than its Southeast Asian 
Neighbours?” Working Paper Series, No. 05-54, Development Studies Institute, London 
School of Economic and Political Science, Feb 2005. 
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systemic approach to national strategy. It takes a multidimensional 
model—political, economic, financial, and military—with each dimension 
having reinforcing consequences on all others. Singapore has used its 
SWFs strategically to make up for its natural limitations in size and 
population, to complement its economic and financial performance, to 
supplement its fiscal policy needs, and by extension to permit the nation to 
afford a technologically superior military and forge politically strong ties 
with strategic allies.  
Many lessons about the operation of SWFs are to be drawn from 
the Singapore experience, especially the need to clearly orient SWFs 
toward serving national interests, the advantages of taking a long-term 
approach to investing, and the benefits of adopting a portfolio of risk 
management. Ultimately, however, SWFs can be no more than tools of 
national strategy. The strategy itself and the national interests they serve 
remain the preserve and the responsibility of political leadership. Only a 
confident, responsible, and competent political leadership can adequately 
define national interests and have the discipline to steward national 
resources in their service. 
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Annex A: Figures and Tables 
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Figure 1: Top 10 Sovereign Wealth Funds (in US$ Billion)37 
 
 
  
                                                          
37 Source: SWF Institute, July 2013 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Sovereign Wealth Fund Assets38  
 
  
                                                          
38 Source: SWF Institute 
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Figure 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Funding Source and 
Region39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Source: SWF Institute 
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Based on data updated July 2013:  
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Figure 4: Stewards of Singapore’s Reserves40 
 
 
  
                                                          
40 Source: Ministry of Finance (Our Nation’s Reserves), Temasek Holdings, and 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd websites 
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Figure 5: Expenditure by the Government of Singapore for 
FY2013 (by Sector)41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
41“Budget Highlights: Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Budget 2013, Singapore 
Government, 25 February 2013, p. 18. 
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Figure 6: Military Expenditure Per Capita by Country, 2012, in 
US$42 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
42 Sources: (1) Military expenditure numbers from Military Expenditure Database, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); (2) Country population 
figures from respective countries’ official census or estimates. 
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Figure 7: Effective Income Tax and Social Security Rates on 
US$100,000 of Gross Income43 
 
  
                                                          
43 “KPMG’s Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate Survey 2012,” KPMG 
International, www.kpmg.com. 
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Location 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hong Kong 17.5 17.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
Singapore 20 20 18 18 17 17 17 17
Switzerland 21.23 20.63 19.21 18.96 18.75 18.31 18.06 18.01
United Kingdom 30 30 30 28 28 26 24 23
China 33 33 25 25 25 25 25 25
Malaysia 28 27 26 25 25 25 25 25
Germany 38.34 38.36 29.51 29.44 29.41 29.37 29.48 29.55
Australia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Japan 40.69 40.69 40.69 40.69 40.69 40.69 38.01 38.01
United States 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
 
 
Figure 8: Corporate Tax Rates of Selected Countries 201344 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG International, 2013 
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Figure 9: Indirect Tax Rates of Selected Countries, 201345 
 
 
 
* VAT or GST has been proposed but the implementation has been postponed. In its 
place, Malaysia has sales tax and service tax. Sales tax is imposed on taxable goods 
manufactured locally/imported, unless exempted. The standard rate of sales tax is 10 
percent…. Service tax is charged on specific types of services (taxable services) 
provided by taxable persons. The rate of service tax is 6 percent.46 
 
^ While the U.S. does not impose a national VAT, most states, and some local 
governments impose transactional based taxes commonly referred to as sales and use 
taxes. … The state and local tax sales tax rate in the US may range from 4 percent to 11 
percent.47 
  
                                                          
45 Indirect Tax Rates Table, KPMG International, 2013, 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/indirect-tax-rates-
table.aspx 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC) 
Over Total Expenditure (Excludes Special Transfers)48 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                          
48 Source: “Budget Highlights, Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Government, 25 February 
2013, http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en 
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Table 1: The 5 Largest Importers of Major Conventional Weapons and 
Their Major Suppliers, 2008-201249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
49 Source: “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet, March 2013. 
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FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
FY2013 
(Budgeted)
Operating Revenue 32,300 32,869 31,638 36,848 40,862 44,142 44,022
Tax Revenue 29,304 30,167 29,294 33,478 36,861 39,590 39,659
Fees and Charges 2,904 2,570 2,212 3,189 3,759 4,292 4,098
Others 92 132 132 181 242 260 264
Total Expenditure 26,386 30,473 33,513 36,270 37,250 40,084 42,728
Operating Expenditure 20,762 22,987 24,727 26,616 28,120 29,766 32,502
Development Expenditure 5,624 7,486 8,786 9,654 9,130 10,319 10,226
Primary Surplus / Deficit 5,914 2,397 -1,875 578 3,611 4,058 1,294
Special Transfers 1,714 5,679 4,385 5,676 6,742 7,094 5,517
Special Transfers Excluding Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds 1,074 3,271 3,257 1,204 2,327 1,172 1,042
Basic Surplus / Deficit 4,841 -874 -5,133 -626 1,284 2,886 253
Top-ups to Endownment and Trust Funds 640 2,408 1,128 4,472 4,414 5,922 4,475
Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution 1,924 3,474 5,605 5,882 6,333 6,122 6,162
Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit 6,125 191 -655 784 3,202 3,086 1,940
1
2
3
4
 
Table 2: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($ 
million)44 
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FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
FY2013 
(Budgeted)
Operating Revenue 14.8% 15.6% 14.0% 14.5% 15.5% 16.1% 14.9%
Tax Revenue 13.4% 14.3% 13.0% 13.2% 14.0% 14.4% 13.4%
Fees and Charges 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% 1.4%
Others 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Total Expenditure 12.1% 14.5% 14.9% 14.3% 14.1% 14.6% 14.5%
Operating Expenditure 9.5% 10.9% 11.0% 10.5% 10.7% 10.8% 11.0%
Development Expenditure 2.6% 3.6% 3.9% 3.8% 3.5% 3.8% 3.5%
Primary Surplus / Deficit 2.7% 1.1% -0.8% 0.2% 1.4% 1.5% 0.4%
Special Transfers 0.8% 2.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.6% 2.6% 1.9%
Special Transfers Excluding Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds 0.5% 1.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.4%
Basic Surplus / Deficit 2.2% -0.4% -2.3% -0.2% 0.5% 1.1% 0.1%
Top-ups to Endownment and Trust Funds 0.3% 1.1% 0.5% 1.8% 1.7% 2.2% 1.5%
Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution 0.9% 1.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.4% 2.2% 2.1%
Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit 2.8% 0.1% -0.3% 0.3% 1.2% 1.1% 0.7%
1
2
3
4
 
 
Table 2, cont’d. 
 
Note: Figures have been converted to USD using the exchange rate US$1 = 
S$1.25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Development Expenditure excludes land-related expenditure. 
2 Special Transfers include Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds. 
3 Surplus/Deficit before Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds and Net 
Investment Income/Returns Contribution. 
4 Prior to FY2009, up to 50 percent of Net Investment Income (NII) could be 
taken into the annual budget for spending. In effect from FY2009, under the Net 
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Investment Returns (NIR) framework, up to 50 percent of the expected long-
term real rate of returns on the relevant assets specified in the constitution can 
be taken in for spending. For the other assets, up to 50 percent of the net 
investment income can continue to be used for spending in the annual budget. 
 
 
 
 
49 Source: “Budget Highlights, Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Government, 25 February 
2013.
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Table 3: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($ 
million) (Items Rearranged) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
FY2013 
(Budgeted)
Operating Revenue 32,300 32,869 31,638 36,848 40,862 44,142 44,022
Less: Total Expenditure 26,386 30,473 33,513 36,270 37,250 40,084 42,728
Primary Surplus / Deficit 5,914 2,397 -1,875 578 3,611 4,058 1,294
Less: Special Transfers 1,714 5,679 4,385 5,676 6,742 7,094 5,517
Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit (before NII/ NIR Contribution) 4,201 -3,282 -6,260 -5,098 -3,130 -3,035 -4,222
Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution 1,924 3,474 5,605 5,882 6,333 6,122 6,162
Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit 6,125 191 -655 784 3,202 3,086 1,940
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